December 2001   VOLUME 54: Number 12 Veterinary Ireland Journal Page CONTENTS Peer review articles are available in full as a Acrobat PDF file You will need to download the Acrobat reader which can be got free at this web site

EDITORIAL   

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The looming threat of bioterrorism

What an incredible year it has been! On September 11, airborne terrorists wreaked havoc upon Manhattan Island and other locations within the USA; in effect, for the best part of a week, they closed down the normal activities of the most powerful nation on the planet. Since then, unidentified malefactors have created further mayhem when they used the US postal service to deliver anthrax spores to intended victims, with fatal consequences for some unfortunate workers who handled the mail in transit. Needless to say, these demonstrations of the vulnerability of democratic societies to terrorism, especially to bioterrorism, have spawned a shoal of copycat missives that delivered terrifying but spore-free white powder. Ireland has had its quota of these bogus terror attacks. It is important that the criminal cynicism of the perpetrators does not make the community too complacent about the real threat of bioterrorism. True, one is entitled to believe that this country is unlikely to be a target for international bioterrorists; nevertheless, we need to be prepared to deal effectively with the practical challenges that would be posed by a terrorist's use of a biological agent.

There are problems that are unique to attacks by biological weapons of mass destruction. In contrast to nuclear or chemical weapons, pathogens are alive, they can multiply and they can adapt to environmental circumstances. Also, the victims of bioterrorism may be unaware of exposure to the pathogen until symptoms appear days or weeks later. Thus, the magnitude of the threat can be amplified with the passage of time. For instance, the time lag between exposure and the recognition of the full-blown disease will facilitate undetected spread of the causal organism within the community before the regulatory authorities are aware of the problem. Therefore, if the terrorist does not reveal the identity of the biological agent, there is a strong likelihood that many citizens will become seriously ill and die, even if the agent is one for which there is a specific treatment. Moreover, there could be a major problem in delivery of specific therapy, either because of inadequate supply of the product or because it cannot be delivered before the disease has reached " the point of no return". Anthrax is a case in point; Bacillus anthracis is susceptible to penicillin, tetracycline, chloramphenicol, gentamicin or erythromycin; but diagnosis is often too late for successful treatment.

The delivery of biological weapons does not require either sophisticated equipment or massive financial resources. The pathogen can be delivered as an aerosol by a simple agricultural sprayer or a perfume atomizer. The received wisdom is that of the 11 microbial agents "very likely to be used", the top four are those that cause smallpox, plague, anthrax and botulism. In recent times this Journal has published commentaries on the pathogenesis of both botulism and anthrax in humans. The specific purpose of those two in-house contributions was to provide our readers with a readily accessible source of information on aspects of the two diseases that are likely to be of concern to clients who have an interest in safe food and public health, as distinct from those whose interest is restricted to veterinary medicine. We believe that our profession should be a senior partner in the team whose task it is to ensure that the food on offer to the consumer is wholesome and safe. Further, we believe that veterinary surgeons are well placed to educate and to reassure the general public whenever questions arise concerning zoonotic diseases and the looming threat of bioterrorism. Our commentaries have been composed with that purpose in mind. The editorial staff would welcome feedback as to whether or not we are on target in that respect. For instance, should we have discussed decontamination in relation to an attack that used anthrax spores?

  It is important to remember that humans are not the only potential targets of the bioterrorists; pathogens may also be aimed at food, water supplies, animals, or plants. There have been suggestions - as yet unconfirmed - that the recent outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) in the UK was the result of an act of bioterrorism. If this rumour is correct, it provides an excellent example of what a devastating effect the bioterrorist might impose on the economic life of a nation, even though that particular microbe was not infectious in the human population.

The EU is now beginning an urgent review of defence systems designed to prevent the malicious introduction of pathogens into the food cycle. As we await the outcome of the review we take this opportunity to remind all and sundry that the FMD outbreak provided incontrovertible evidence that communicable diseases are managed best when farmers, politicians, civil servants and veterinarians sing from the same hymnal. There can be no doubt that the same would be true if we had to contend with the activities of a bioterrorist. The Expert Group that advised the Minister during the FMD crisis did an excellent job, which won the confidence of all sectors of the community. It would not be particularly prudent to allow the Group to fade into oblivion simply because the threat of FMD has receded; there are several other problems to which it could apply the unity of purpose that it harnessed so successfully in response to the threat of FMD. Its help would not go amiss in the event of a biological attack.

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